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ABSTRACT 
Acre State in Brazil is at the forefront of efforts to institutionalize 
jurisdictional-scale policies that aim to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). Given limited REDD+ funds 
and uncertain returns from alternative land uses, this paper estimates the 
minimum incentive payment Acre’s government would have to pay forest 
landowners in each of its 22 municipalities to ensure forest conservation. 
Despite lower profits but with lower conversion costs and more stable 
returns over time relative to corn and coffee production, cattle pasture 
generates the highest returns in 19 municipalities. Municipalities are 
ranked according to their relative policy costs, a ranking which is compared 
to the distribution of forest carbon stocks across Acre. Finally, the relative 
cost per tonne of carbon is derived, which enables the identification of a 
group of 13 municipalities with the greatest potential for ‘carbon bang’ for 
a given ‘buck’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), policies could 
either attempt to reduce the profitability of agriculture, e.g. by removing agricultural subsidies, or 
offer positive incentives such as payment for environmental services (PES) that aim to put a price on 
forest externalities (Angelsen, 2010; Palmer, 2011). The latter have come to dominate both project 
and nascent jurisdictional-scale REDD+ strategies (see e.g. Mahanty et al., 2013; Sills et al., 2014). 
Acre State in Brazil, the setting for our paper, is currently at the forefront of efforts to institutionalize 
jurisdictional-scale REDD+. At an estimated cost of US$260 million, the State government’s objective 
is to reduce deforestation by 80% by 2020, thus conserving 5.5 million hectares of forest in order to 
prevent the release of 62.5 Mt of CO2 emissions (Herbert, 2010). To this end, Acre has established a 
‘PES-like’ scheme known as the Incentive System for Environmental Services (SISA) framework. Its 
objective is to internalize values associated with forest carbon, as well as biodiversity and 
hydrological services, by incentivizing landowners to conserve forest on their landholdings.  
In this paper, we model a hypothetical SISA payment in order to address two related questions. First, 
given the extent of uncertainty in land-use returns from forest conversion, what is the minimum 
level of payment that Acre’s government should pay to landowners to ensure forest conservation 
with a 90% probability? Reflecting the common practice of Latin American incentive payment 
schemes, our payment is held constant over time. The ‘90% probability’ is illustrative of a setting in 
which there is a relatively strong commitment on the part of the policymaker to enforce 
conservation contracts and hence, keep land in forest. That said, should alternative land uses 
become more profitable, e.g. due to rising commodity prices, it may not be possible to prevent 
contract breach altogether thus reflecting imperfect enforcement of conservation contracts (e.g. 
Engel and Palmer, 2008; MacKenzie et al., 2012; Jayachandran, 2013).  
Our model is applied to municipality-scale, publicly-available data, which allows us to estimate the 
uncertain returns of an ‘average’ landowner within each municipality, one faced with the decision of 
whether to keep land in forest or convert it to an alternative land use. For each of Acre’s 
municipalities, we estimate the uncertain returns for three alternative land uses: cattle, corn, and 
coffee. These three land uses are among the most popular ones adopted in Acre and have relatively 
good data availability. We then identify the minimum per hectare cost to the policymaker of 
conserving forest in each of Acre’s 22 municipalities before ranking the municipalities according to 
ascending payment levels, i.e. moving from the municipalities with the lowest opportunity costs to 
those with the highest ones. The second question we ask is whether and (if so) how this ranking of 
municipalities changes when we consider their carbon stocks. Finally, our estimates of policy costs 
are combined with carbon stock data to give a novel measure of municipality-scale environmental 
cost-effectiveness: the minimum relative cost, in terms of the forgone profits from alternative land 
uses under uncertainty, per tonne of carbon. 
In studies that evaluate the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of PES, two key assumptions are 
typically made. First, it is often assumed that future returns from forest conversion are known with 
certainty (e.g. Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Börner et al., 2010; Groom and Palmer, 2010; Palmer and 
Silber, 2012; Curran et al., 2016). Yet, up-front investments combined with greater uncertainty in 
agricultural returns create incentives to delay the decision to convert forest to an alternative use 
(Schatzki, 2003). This implies that a lower level of incentive would be required to prevent forest 
conversion. In general, a failure to consider uncertainty in future agricultural returns results in 
estimates of the opportunity costs of forest conservation that are biased upwards. The consequence 
is that payment levels would be set higher than necessary in order to incentivize forest conservation. 
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Second, it is also commonly assumed that the environmental benefits from conserving forest are 
homogenous across space. However, it has become increasingly clear that this assumption is 
erroneous. For example, Saatchi et al. (2011) demonstrate wide variation in forest carbon stocks, 
even at the local scale, e.g. within municipalities. A failure to consider heterogeneity in forests and 
their corresponding eco-system services can thus lead to under- or over-estimates of benefits from 
conservation (see Vincent, 2016).   
In Acre, funds for SISA remain dependent on public sources of funding despite a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in 2010 with the US State of California to provide REDD+ credits. There is 
currently little scope for the use of carbon markets and offsetting to augment Acre’s conservation 
budget. Given this limited budget, the basic idea behind our analysis is to identify municipalities in 
Acre where it might be possible to conserve a lot of carbon at relatively low cost. Our paper 
contributes to Acre’s ongoing efforts to design an efficient and effective set of forest conservation 
institutions, particularly with respect to jurisdictional REDD+, which are described in Section 2. We 
do so by adapting the model of uncertain land-use returns by Engel et al. (2015), in Section 3. First, 
we adapt their model so that it is more consistent with most Latin American PES schemes, namely by 
changing the incentive from a variable to a fixed, area-based payment and by creating a shorter 
payments period (five years instead of 30). Second, in examining three different land uses and with 
22 different starting points, i.e. one for each municipality in Acre, we move away from their focus on 
a single alternative land use and a single starting point for estimating policy costs.  
We exploit spatial heterogeneity in land-use returns and model these returns over time using 
publicly available data, which are described in Section 4. Since similar data are increasingly available 
for other tropical countries, in addition to other Brazilian States, our model can easily be applied to 
other settings and land uses. Further, we exploit the spatial variation in forest carbon stocks across 
the State and by comparing these with the relative land use returns, provide an economic rationale 
for the targeting of REDD+ payments. Building upon Engel et al. (2015), our analysis therefore not 
only estimates the spatial variation in the cost of keeping forests standing but also integrates these 
costs with forest carbon stock data in order to derive a measure of cost-effectiveness across 
municipalities. In sum, our model offers a novel and straightforward way of allocating scarce 
conservation resources and while our focus is on forest climate benefits, it can easily be expanded to 
accommodate other ecosystem services and biodiversity. 
Presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6, our results suggest that although pasture and 
cattle ranching is not particularly profitable, it is the land use which results in the highest (relative) 
returns to landowners under uncertainty, in 19 out of 22 municipalities. With relatively low 
conversion costs and little volatility in its returns process, pasture determines the minimum payment 
level in these areas. Upon ranking municipalities by payment level and by carbon stock, we find that 
cheaper municipalities tend not to have higher stocks. However, this type of ranking masks wide 
differences among municipalities. Our empirical exercise demonstrates evidence of substantial, 
economically-meaningful and policy-relevant variation among municipalities. On the basis of cost 
per tonne of carbon, we identify 13 municipalities in which it might be possible to obtain a 
substantially larger 'carbon bang' for one's 'buck' in contrast to the other nine municipalities.  
2. BACKGROUND TO ACRE STATE, BRAZIL 
Acre in western Brazil has become a world leader in reducing deforestation while growing its 
economy (Schwartzman, 2015). The State is home to around 750,000 people. Almost half live in the 
capital, Rio Branco, while the remainder reside among its 22 municipalities. Since the election of The 
Acre Workers Party and their allies The Popular Front in 1998, the State government has followed 
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the vision of legendary rubber tapper and environmental activist Chico Mendes towards a 
sustainable development pathway for the State. 
About 14.3 million hectares (143,000km2) of intact, richly diverse forest, approximately 87% of its 
total area, is found within State borders. Primary forest makes up over 85% of forest cover. The 
majority of this forest is covered by some form of protection, whether indigenous territory, parks or 
reserves. Deforestation has fallen over recent years, from an average annual deforestation rate of 
60,200 hectares (602 km2) per year between 1996 and 2005, to 49,600 hectares (496 km2) per year 
between 2001 and 2010.  
Acre State set itself two main deforestation goals, to reduce levels by 60% of the 1990-2005 average 
by 2012, and by 80% by 2020. Total emissions for the State were estimated at 22.7 Mt CO2e in 2010, 
of which 97% came from deforestation and land degradation. The reduction in deforestation rates 
has meant that Acre has managed to move forward in issuing verified emission reduction credits to 
the tune of 11.5 Mt CO2e through the Markit registry (Forest Trends, 2015). In order to meet the 
State’s deforestation goals and achieve verifiable emission reductions it has created the SISA 
framework, along with operational principles for a system of incentives, not only for forest carbon 
but also biodiversity and hydrological services.  
The majority of deforested lands are now pasture (TerraClass, 2011) and this is representative of the 
typology of the agricultural sector in Acre. Pasture lands make up approximately 8% of total land 
area of the State. By contrast, temporary crops take up 1% of total land area, of which cassava and 
corn account for the greatest share. The acreage of permanent crops is much smaller, just 0.1% of 
land area. The largest permanent crop is banana, approximately 60% of the total, followed by rubber 
and coffee, at around 11% each.  
Acre has 22 municipalities. A major land-zoning exercise in 2006, focusing on both economic and 
ecological concerns, created four major land-use zones (Governo do Estado do Acre, 2011): Zone 1 
(25% of State land) is private land or agricultural settlements of which approximately half is 
deforested; Zone 2 (49%) is intact primary or managed forests in indigenous territories, sustainable 
use reserves, settlement projects, state and national production forests, and strictly protected areas; 
Zone 3 (26%) has largely intact forest cover but has land tenure that is unclear or where claims 
overlap; and, Zone 4 (0.2%) is defined as urban. 
3. MODEL 
Engel et al. (2015) developed a general model of a conservation payment scheme with fixed and 
variable components in which the latter is either indexed to the value of one or more services 
provided by forest, e.g. carbon, or to the expected net returns from forest conversion, e.g. soya bean 
production. By tracking carbon or soya prices, this variable component thus allows the payment to 
vary over time. The scheme’s objective is to provide sufficient incentives to keep land in forest 
rather than convert it to an alternative use. In this paper, we retain their objective and basic model 
but adapt the latter in three ways.  
First, since shorter contracts are typically found in Latin American payment for environmental 
services (PES) schemes, e.g. in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008), we model a conservation contract of five 
rather than 30 years. Second, also in common with many Latin American PES schemes, we model a 
payment that is not indexed but instead is fixed and unchanging over time. Finally, although our 
payment is characterised as an incentive provided by Acre's government to conserve forest carbon 
stocks (a generic ‘REDD+ payment’), it does not reflect the social value of the carbon in a given 
hectare of forest. Rather, it is calculated as the minimum payment required to keep forest standing 
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when the net returns from alternative land uses are uncertain. Below, we reproduce the model of 
Engel et al. (2015) and intuitively explain the theory underlying our adaptation of their model. 
Landowner’s decision 
For a single hectare of land, profits can be generated from one of two alternative uses: forest (F) or 
agriculture (A). For simplicity, we do not specify A in this section, although as explained in Section 4 
it can be pasture (cattle), corn, or coffee. Whenever land use is changed from F to A, conversion 
costs, CCFA, are sunk immediately. Proﬁts to a landowner from forest conservation are generated by 
a REDD+ payment scheme implemented by Acre’s State government. This payment is paid annually 
and is fixed at F, i.e. future returns from forest are certain. Net proﬁts from agriculture are 
generated from crop sales1 and future returns from agriculture are uncertain. 
In theory, the presence of uncertainty in agricultural returns should delay land conversion until the 
value of non-use beneﬁts equals the value of land in the next-best alternative use plus conversion 
costs plus an option value. Our aim is to identify an F that makes this option value suﬃciently large 
to deter land conversion for a total of five years.  
New information about the uncertain returns from agriculture is assumed to become available at 
various times such that they may be modelled as a stochastic process (e.g. geometric Brownian 
motion, GBM). The net returns from agriculture to the land owner, A, is private information which 
evolves as a function of the constant trend parameter µA and the (positive) constant uncertainty 
parameter σA: 
𝑑𝐴 = 𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑊𝐴   [1] 
where 𝑑𝑊𝐴 = 𝜖 √𝑑𝑡 with 𝜖 distributed as a standard normal random variable, e.g. 𝜖 ∈ 𝑁(0,1). A 
positive (negative) µA indicates that net agricultural proﬁts are, on average, increasing (decreasing). 
In Section 5, we parameterize the agricultural returns processes. 
On each day, dt, a landowner receives Fdt if the land is in forest or Adt if the land is in agriculture. 
With a starting point of land in forest, the landowner decides, every six months, whether to continue 
conserving forest or to convert the forest to agriculture. The decision to change land use generates 
instantaneous proﬁts net of conversion costs. Alternatively, the landowner can delay the decision to 
deforest and continue to receive REDD+ payments. Thus, the value of a single hectare of forest is: 
𝑓(𝐹, 𝐴, 𝑡) = max{𝜋𝐹 , 𝜋𝐴 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐴}  [2] 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation [2] describes the returns if the land is kept in forest. 
In this case, the landowner receives a payment of Fdt and the discounted future expected returns 
from forest conservation. Therefore, πF represents the sum of the landowner’s returns from non-use 
beneﬁts of the forest (current land use) and the future value of land in the next-best alternative use 
(forest or agriculture):  
𝜋𝐹 = 𝐹𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒−𝑟 𝑑𝑡𝐸[𝑓(𝐹 + 𝑑𝐹, 𝐴 + 𝑑𝐴, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡)] 
where E is the expectation operator. All returns are valued by discounting their expected values at 
the constant, continuously compounded, risk-free discount rate r. The second term of equation [2] 
represents the returns when the land is converted from forest to agriculture. The landowner incurs 
sunk conversion costs equal to {𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐴}. Using the same line of reasoning and with a starting point of 
land in agriculture, we can obtain the equation that describes the returns if the land is kept in 
                                                          
1
 Conversion from forest to agriculture may also generate a one-time timber proﬁt. Such extra proﬁt may be 
explicitly accounted for by modeling the timber price, the volume of timber extracted from the forest, and the 
harvest costs. For model tractability, we do not explicitly model these proﬁts. In Section 5, however, we 
incorporate a one-oﬀ timber proﬁt. 
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agriculture, g(F,A,t) and the expression πA that represents the sum of landowner’s returns from 
agricultural use: 
𝜋𝐴 = 𝐴𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒−𝑟 𝑑𝑡𝐸[𝑔(𝐹 + 𝑑𝐹, 𝐴 + 𝑑𝐴, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡)] 
To solve the land use change problem, we first evaluate the optimal conversion boundaries as in 
Engel et al. (2015). These depend upon the parameters of the returns from forest F and agriculture 
A, respectively, the conversion costs {𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐴} and the discount rate r. We then solve for the optimal 
land-use change numerically. Instead of modelling the price and crop yield uncertainties separately, 
the agricultural returns processes are modelled directly. This simpliﬁes our analysis considerably and 
allows us to utilize existing numerical techniques, used by e.g. Miranda and Fackler (2002), Dangl 
and Wirl (2004), to solve the optimal land–conversion problem. In practice, the landowner compares 
two alternative land uses as described below.  
REDD+ payment parameters 
Our model is used to simulate REDD+ payment scenarios in order to estimate the level of incentive 
needed to ensure that the landowner continues to postpone the decision to switch from forest to 
agriculture. The landowner’s opportunity costs of forest conservation are the forgone returns to 
agriculture, A. Given A we estimate the level of the REDD+ payment that ensures forest 
conservation. We assume that Acre’s government seeks to achieve conservation at the lowest 
possible cost and that the landowner will not always comply with the REDD+ contract. Thus, we 
introduce the possibility that at some point it might be more profitable for the landowner to convert 
forest to agriculture. The potential for contract breach is modelled using a probability-based 
criterion, in which p is defined as the probability of avoiding deforestation and (1 − p) corresponds to 
the probability of deforestation.  
For a given hectare of forest, we establish an illustrative probability level of p=0.9 and a time horizon 
of T = 5 and estimate the REDD+ payment necessary to ensure that the land remains in forest. We 
argue that a 90% probability of avoiding deforestation reflects Acre’s ongoing efforts to build 
institutional capacity for REDD+ at the jurisdictional level, including institutions for monitoring and 
enforcement. Thus, this 90% probability is illustrative of a setting in which there is a relatively strong 
commitment on the part of the policymaker to enforce conservation contracts and hence, keep land 
in forest.2 Note that, operationally, we implement the same payment regime as Engel et al. (2015) 
but identify a constant per-hectare payment F.3 In our adaptation, the landowners’ opportunity 
costs of forest conservation are based on uncertain returns from the production and sale of coffee, 
corn or cattle. 
To determine the REDD+ payment that satisﬁes this criterion, we ﬁrst evaluate the optimal 
conversion boundaries as described above given a speciﬁc set of model parameters. For a given 
REDD+ payment level, we simulate the returns from agriculture. When these returns are below the 
conversion boundary CFA, the landowner prefers to switch land use, converting forest to agriculture. 
This comparison is assessed every six months. The simulation yields a converted path when 
agriculture becomes more proﬁtable than forest at any given comparison node. With forest 
conversion, the contract is breached and REDD+ payments cease, which is equivalent to imposing a 
conditionality clause on the REDD+ contract. Dividing the total number of non-converted paths by 
the number of simulations, we compute the likelihood of a land-use change from forest to 
agriculture not occurring, ?̂?. The probability-based criterion is met when ?̂? ≥ 𝑝 = 0.9. 
 
                                                          
2
 A decreasing (increasing) p unequivocally decreases (increases) the REDD+ payment necessary to ensure that 
land remains in forest.  
3
 In practice, we implement the payment regime as in Engel et al. (2015) and set the variable leg of the REDD+ 
payment to be very small. Hence, the REDD+ payment is virtually always constant over time. 
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4. DATA  
Our model in Section 3 is based on the land-use decision faced by a landowner. In the absence of 
landowner-level data, we apply our model to publicly-available agricultural data at the municipality 
scale. Thus, we compare differences in average net profits for three, different land uses, which are 
estimated at the municipality scale from data reported by farmers and landowners sampled within 
municipalities.  
Applying the model presented in Section 3 to real-world data requires first identifying the 
commonest land-use transitions from forest conversion in Acre State over a five-year period. From 
Section 2, pasture for cattle ranching was clearly more common than any of the other land uses put 
together. We also select corn as one of the most popular temporary crops and coffee, a permanent 
crop, which has been gaining in popularity in the region. While there are other, similarly popular 
crops, e.g. cassava, banana, our choice is also determined by data availability. Municipality-level 
production data are shown in Appendix 1.  
Note that for the five-year duration of contract it was often the case that land once planted, and 
with conversion costs sunk, would remain either in pasture or coffee for the whole of this time. For 
corn, however, farmers could switch to a different land use after three years thus incurring another 
round of conversion costs. We are unable to build another land-use decision into our model 
simulations for corn and for tractability instead assumed that corn was planted for five years. 
Switching from corn to beef or coffee within five years would not, however, significantly change the 
ranking of municipalities by minimum payment level.  
Daily profits 
The returns from converting a hectare of land from forest to agriculture depend upon a variety of 
factors including production costs, clearance and conversion costs, yields, prices and transportation 
costs. We combine these factors in order to estimate daily profits, Adt. The per-hectare return (in 
US$) on day t from agricultural commodity x is given by: 
𝜋𝑡𝑥 = (𝑃𝑡𝑥𝑌𝑥) − (𝐹𝑖𝑥 + 𝐿𝑡𝑥 + 𝐹𝑒𝑡𝑥 + 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑥 + 𝑇𝑡𝑥) [3] 
where 𝑃 is the price of commodity x in US$/tonne, 𝑌 is its yield (tonne/ha), 𝐿 is its labour cost 
(US$/ha), 𝐹𝑒 is its fertiliser cost (US$/ha), 𝐹𝑢 is its fuel cost (US$/ha), 𝐹𝑖𝑥 is its fixed cost (US$/ha), 
and 𝑇 is the cost of transporting x to market (US$/ha). 
For each of corn, cattle and coffee, we estimate the value of each of these variables for each day in 
the five-year period between March 31, 2006 and December 30, 2010, before calculating daily 
returns. Daily agricultural price data are combined with quarterly data on labour costs, annual yield 
data, and overall costs per hectare for fixed, labour, fertiliser and fuel in order to create daily 
revenue and cost time-series, with the costs subtracted from the revenue series to give net profits. 
We draw the majority of data from the Brazilian Agricultural Census of 2006 (IBGE, 2006). More 
detail on data sources and individual factors, including our measure of carbon stock density, are 
presented in Appendix 2. Despite relatively good data availability, we face a number of challenges 
when creating suitable daily price series for our chosen commodities in Acre State.  
First, there are gaps in the price data. In order to create a daily price series for each commodity, we 
converted the daily price series for São Paulo and via benchmarks for prices in Rio Branco created 
price series for Acre. Since this approach factors in differences in prices due to assumptions about 
the location of demand for each commodity - and hence, where it is transported - it potentially 
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underestimates transportation costs in more remote regions of Acre state. This is particularly the 
case for corn and cattle that are not shipped to Rio Branco to be sold.  
Second, there are some missing data in the Agricultural Census for some of the cost components of 
corn and coffee production. Since we have seen no evidence to suggest that there may be, on 
average, substantial differences in the costs of coffee and corn production at the municipality scale 
in the Legal Amazon, we filled these gaps by applying regression analysis to municipality-scale data 
for the whole Legal Amazon. This approach assumes that agricultural production in Acre state 
follows the same techniques, and utilizes the same mix of inputs, as used by the average Amazonian 
farmer.   
Third, the Agricultural Census reports at the municipality level and is biased towards the sampling of 
larger farms. At this scale of aggregation, we may therefore overlook important intra-municipality 
variation in terms of costs and returns. If larger farmers have different yields, mix of inputs and costs 
in contrast to their smaller counterparts our estimates of average returns may not be perfectly 
representative, especially in municipalities with greater shares of smaller farmers. We return to the 
issue of potential variation in profitability among landowners and farmers within municipalities in 
Section 6. 
5. RESULTS 
We first present our estimates of daily net profits for our three agricultural land uses (pasture 
(cattle), corn, and coffee) at the municipality scale over a five-year period. These estimates are used 
to calculate our model parameters, which are then combined with our estimates of up-front 
clearance costs in order to simulate the returns processes under uncertainty for each land use in 
each and every municipality in Acre State. The returns are then ranked to give the policymaker's cost 
of the minimum payment to landowners in each municipality. Cost per municipality is then 
compared with the distribution of carbon densities across the State. From our estimates of minimum 
payment and data for mean carbon stock, we derive a novel measure of relative environmental cost-
effectiveness: the minimum relative cost, in terms of the forgone profits from alternative land uses 
under uncertainty, per tonne of carbon. 
Daily net profits 
Table 1 presents a summary of patterns in the daily per hectare net profits from pasture, corn and 
coffee between 2006 and 2010. Only one of these land uses remains profitable over the whole 
period in 11 municipalities, typically corn. Pasture appears to result in consistent negative net profits 
in most municipalities.  
Negative net profits are obtained due to the use of observable market prices, which proxy for 
landowners’ returns from alternative land uses. We conjecture that commercial production may 
simply be unprofitable in much of Acre given remoteness and high costs. For instance, we may be 
underestimating prices. The São Paulo price, even with adjustment may not reflect higher prices in 
local markets due to their remoteness.4 Subsistence agriculture dominates in a lot of municipalities, 
which is unlikely to be accounted for in government-collected statistics. Sampling in the Brazilian 
Agricultural Census tends to be biased towards larger farms. Since larger farms are more likely to 
                                                          
4
 In the Agricultural Census, the prices of corn and coffee sold in Rio Branco are below those quoted in São 
Paulo but we do not know whether or not higher prices are fetched in the more remote areas of Acre, e.g. due 
to a relative lack of supply and higher transportation costs (especially in those municipalities with little or no 
road access). 
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hire in labour in contrast to smallholders, we may overestimate costs. Finally, we may be 
underestimating yields and note that our estimates may be missing subsidies that effectively reduce 
costs or increase profits, e.g. credit subsidies. 
Figure 1 illustrates net profits for selected municipalities. Bujari is a good example of one where 
there is a clearly ‘strictly dominant’ profitable land use, in this case coffee. There, a rational land 
owner would convert forest to this land use rather than either of the other two. Feijó, on the other 
hand, illustrates a case where ‘the lines cross’ and the relative profitability of one land use changes 
such that at different times it would be rational to switch from one of corn, coffee or pasture, to one 
of the other two, and back again at a later date.  
Table 1: Summary of patterns of per hectare daily net profits for pasture (cattle), corn, and coffee 
for Acre’s municipalities, 2006-2010 
Figure 1: Daily net profits in US$ for Bujari and Feijó, 2006-2010 
In general, and of relevance for modelling returns processes under uncertainty, coffee appears to 
have the most volatile net profits while beef has the least. Recall that greater volatility in returns is 
predicted to lead to a greater incentive to delay land-use change, from forest to agriculture. A 
measure of volatility is more important than the absolute level of profits in determining the relative 
level of returns under uncertainty, and the likelihood of whether the landowner is likely to stay with 
forest or convert to an alternative land use. This implies that there are no limitations in using 
negative net profits to estimate the volatility of the returns process under uncertainty. 
Clearance costs 
From net profits, which allow us to estimate the volatility in returns over time, we now turn our 
attention to the second key component needed to estimate land-use returns under uncertainty: up-
front clearance costs. For each municipality, these costs are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Clearance costs by municipality for forest-corn, forest-coffee & forest-pasture (US$/ha) 
By a factor of three to four, and often more, Table 2 shows that clearing forest for coffee is more 
expensive than corn or pasture in all municipalities. Clearance costs of the latter two are broadly 
equivalent, although those of corn are typically lower. This implies that the decision to delay is likely 
to be greatest for landowners considering converting forest to coffee, followed by pasture and corn, 
and indicates that coffee has a lower degree of reversibility than the other two land uses. In sum, 
given the trends in volatility and clearance costs, the cultivation of coffee would appear to give the 
greatest incentives to delay the decision to convert forest in comparison to pasture or corn. We now 
turn to calibrating these variables more precisely in order to estimate landowners’ returns under 
uncertainty.   
Returns under uncertainty and minimum payment levels 
The model presented in Section 3, namely the constant trend parameter, µ, and the variance, σ, is 
calibrated using the estimated daily profits. Table 3 shows the calibrated parameters for each land 
use for all of Acre’s municipalities. The three columns represent the three alternative land uses from 
forest conversion, i.e. forest-corn, forest-coffee and forest-pasture. Recall that a positive (negative) 
µ indicates that net agricultural proﬁts are, on average, increasing (decreasing); by comparing net 
profits in Table 1 with the trend parameters in Table 3 this pattern can be clearly discerned.  
Table 3: Calibrated parameters for the three alternative land uses by municipality 
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For each municipality, we compare the opportunity costs of forest conservation (for three different 
alternative land uses: coffee, corn, cattle) under uncertainty with a certain REDD+ payment in order 
to ensure the land stays in forest with a probability p of 90 percent over a time period T of five years. 
Thus, the level of REDD+ payment is ‘set’ to make forest the preferable ‘alternative’ 90% of the 
time/simulations. From this, we can estimate the minimum level of payment Acre's government 
should make in order to ensure forest conservation with a 90% probability given uncertain land-use 
returns from forest conversion.  
After estimating the uncertain returns for pasture, corn, and coffee in each municipality, we then 
assume that a rational landowner would choose the one that would earn her the highest returns. 
This establishes the minimum level at which the REDD+ payment should be set by the policymaker.  
It is characterised as a cost to the policymaker, highlighted in one of the three ‘Cost’ columns of 
Table 4 for each municipality. Note that ‘Cost’ is given as a relative rather than an absolute number 
due to the predominance of negative net profits reported in Table 1. Figure 2 displays the data for all 
three ‘Cost’ columns’ for each municipality and Figure 3 displays the data for the highlighted column 
(minimum payment) for each municipality in geographic form.  
Table 4: Ranked relative land-use returns under uncertainty (‘Cost’ per ha; lowest first) and mean 
carbon stock by municipality (ranking in parentheses, highest first) 
Figure 2: Relative cost of payment per ha to cover opportunity cost of each land use by 
municipality 
Figure 3: Map of the minimum payment required to maintain forest in each municipality. 
 
Ranking municipalities and environmental cost-effectiveness 
Relative ‘Cost’ allows for a comparison of minimum REDD+ payments both across land uses within 
municipalities and across municipalities. Municipalities are ranked according to ‘Cost’, lowest first, 
highest last. Thus, Brasiléia has the lowest relative cost of all the municipalities if we assume that 
landowners in every municipality were to convert forest and choose the agricultural land use with 
the highest opportunity cost in that municipality in the absence of a payment.  
Table 4 shows where a policymaker in Acre might target conservation funds if minimising costs per 
hectare - thus spreading the budget among as many hectares of forest as possible – is assumed to be 
the sole aim of policy. The final column of Table 4 presents the data underlying the carbon density 
map (Figure A1) along with the ranks used to create Figure A2. From this, the most carbon dense 
municipality, on average, Assis Brasil, is ranked 17 according to policy cost, i.e. one of the more 
expensive municipalities in which to pay landowners to conserve forest. While there are no clear 
patterns with regards to cost ranking and carbon ranking, Jordão stands out as a place where a 
payments scheme may be cheap (ranking #3) and carbon benefits are likely to be high (ranking#2). 
Perhaps a more efficient way of targeting payments, at least given the distribution of carbon stocks, 
is to move away from a ranking based on costs alone. Given wide variation in mean carbon stocks 
among the municipalities, cheaper areas may not contain as much carbon as some of the more 
expensive ones. Figure 4 presents the relative cost per tonne of carbon, indexed to the municipality 
with the lowest cost: Santa Rosa do Purus. On this basis, we can see that Assis Brasil, our most 
carbon-dense municipality, is ranked second and only just a bit more costly than Santa Rosa do 
Purus. By contrast, Jordão is over 50 percent more expensive than either of these two municipalities. 
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The most expensive municipalities by far are Rodrigues Alves and Placido de Castro, which are, 
respectively, over three and 2.5 times more expensive than Santa Rosa do Purus.  
Figure 4: Relative cost per ton carbon  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we estimated the returns under uncertainty from three different, alternative land uses 
for each and every municipality in Acre State, Brazil. Since these land uses have been shown to drive 
the decision of whether or not to deforest, addressing them should be central to the formulation of 
REDD+ policy in the State, in particular, ongoing efforts to design a programme of incentive 
payments such as SISA. Building upon the model of conservation payments by Engel et al. (2015), we 
modelled our REDD+ payment on the basis of a fixed financial incentive, which allowed us to 
estimate the minimum level of payment that might be sufficient to incentivise a five-year delay in 
the decision to convert forest to pasture, corn or coffee. We then combined the relative cost of the 
payment with mean amounts of carbon found in each municipality in order to assess how much 
'carbon bang' a policy maker might obtain for a given 'buck'. 
When conversion costs are sunk and the returns from alternative land uses are uncertain, it is 
optimal for land owners to delay land use change (Schatzki, 2003; Engel et al., 2015). Land use can 
be considered a real asset with an attached perpetual option to convert it to another land use at any 
time. The benefit of waiting rises with the degree of uncertainty: the larger the volatility of the 
returns from the alternative land uses, the larger the option value to delay land conversion. Equally, 
the lower is the required REDD+ payment to delay deforestation. Thus, uncertainty about the 
returns from agriculture and sunk conversion costs lowers the payment needed to make forest 
conservation more profitable than agricultural production.  
Cattle-ranching determines the level of the minimum payment in most municipalities. Despite not 
being a highly profitable land use, pasture has relatively low up-front costs and generates stable 
returns over time, certainly in contrast to coffee. The incentive to delay conversion to pasture is 
often lower than that for coffee thus necessitating a higher payment to a landowner considering the 
former rather than the latter. In other words, the returns from coffee are subject to greater volatility 
than pasture (or corn), which lowers the opportunity cost of forest conservation and consequently, 
generates a larger option value to delay forest conversion. This indicates that coffee has a lower 
degree of reversibility than the other two land uses.  
Looking across Acre, the most expensive municipalities in which to conserve forest are those in the 
middle of the State, following the main highway, BR364. The cheaper municipalities are mostly 
located in more remote areas in the North West and the South East. We note that these more 
remote municipalities are also likely to be at less immediate risk of deforestation than the more 
centrally located ones. Yet, municipalities identified as having minimum payments at the lower end 
of the scale tend not to be the ones with the highest carbon stocks. Our ranking of carbon stocks 
obscures the wide variation among (and within) municipalities. We account for this variation by 
estimating the cost per tonne of carbon and hence, can identify a group of 13 municipalities in which 
costs vary by up to 25%. Our estimates imply that these 13 municipalities could be prioritised for 
cost-effective conservation of forest carbon stock and hence, help determine the allocation of 
limited REDD+ funds in Acre State. Furthermore, if the policymaker is able to identify the 
municipalities of greatest deforestation risk in this group then the number of municipalities subject 
to policy targeting could be further reduced.  
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In generating our results, we assumed a certain REDD+ payment over time. There remains, however, 
great uncertainty about the future of REDD+ both in terms of the policy architecture and its funding 
(Laing et al., 2016). This helps explain why we opted to model five-year contracts in Acre, a State 
that has already gone some way to positioning itself not only as ‘conservation friendly’ but also as a 
jurisdiction for implementing REDD+ policies. That said, our approach is applicable in other settings, 
where there may be less certainty with respect to REDD+ funding and policy. Indeed, our results hold 
if the REDD+ payment is uncertain but relatively less uncertain than the returns from agriculture. 
Our model can easily be extended to accommodate a longer time-scale than five years in settings 
where policymakers aim to conserve forest carbon stocks over time-scales that are more consistent 
with broader climate policy. However, over a time scale of say 30 years, as modelled by Engel et al. 
(2015), we note that there is likely to a much less predictive power in using past data to model 
future agricultural returns processes. Instead, more up-to-date data could be used to re-calibrate 
the model and reset minimum payment levels every few years.  
Minimum REDD+ payment levels are modelled using estimates of daily net profits and conversion 
costs. Negative net profits predominate, likely due to data constraints, which are an obstacle to 
obtaining absolute rather than relative cost estimates. Yet, given that our analysis is determined by 
the volatility of returns over time, the use of relative profits is sufficient to illustrate the application 
of our model to Acre State. We find that minimum payment levels are quite similar across 
municipalities, the calculation of which necessitated the use of aggregate data at the municipality 
scale rather than more granular data collected at the landowner scale. That said, the extent of 
heterogeneity in the variability of agricultural returns is arguably better than expected given the 
granularity of the available data.  
The application of our model to data at the municipality scale potentially masks variation not only in 
the profitability of different farmers, e.g. small-scale farms might be less profitable and hence, have 
lower opportunity costs than large landowners, but also in the profitability of different land uses 
within municipalities. But since our analysis is based less on variation in absolute values of net 
returns and more on differences in the variability of net returns, evidence of sufficient variation in 
the latter would be needed in order to substantially change our results.  
Our model application is meant to be illustrative; it can easily be applied to data collected at the 
farm and agricultural household scale. Regardless of land use, Delacote et al. (2014) demonstrate 
relatively little variation in the opportunity costs of forest conservation in a sample of households in 
the Brazilian Amazon. If this sample is representative then it downplays the extent to which 
heterogeneity among farms within municipalities might influence our results. A lack of variation, in 
turn, implies a low level of informational rents. Thus, our municipality-level estimates might be 
sufficient for setting differentiated SISA payments among municipalities without excessive 
informational rents accruing to farmers who decide to opt into the scheme. Again, note that it is 
differences in the variability of net returns over time that drive our results and to our knowledge, we 
know of no (panel) data collected at the landowner or household scale that can demonstrate how 
such variability might vary among landowners. 
In local settings, where opportunity costs vary greatly and where there are greater differences in the 
variability of net returns, there is potential for greater informational rents accruing to landowners. 
This is private information and mechanisms could be applied in order to obtain such information and 
reduce informational rents, in particular, screening contracts and reverse auctions (see Ferraro, 
2008). The extent to which payments ought to become more spatially differentiated in order to 
reduce informational rents is likely to be at least partially dependent on the additional (transactions) 
costs, which arise as the complexity of the payment scheme increases. 
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Given limited conservation budgets, our model offers a novel and straightforward way of utilising 
publicly-available data – at whatever scale - to target such funds. It can also be easily expanded to 
incorporate other land-uses within and beyond agriculture. From Section 2 note, however, that 
around 25% of State land is subject to unclear land tenure, the distribution of which is likely to vary 
across municipalities. Clear tenure is critical for the successful functioning of any kind of PES scheme. 
Spatial data on tenure at the local level could be used to help identify areas with targeted land uses 
and where tenure is already reasonably secure. Regarding forest benefits, our application of the 
model focused on carbon stocks but it can be extended to incorporate other ecosystem services and 
biodiversity. Indeed, the mapping of policy costs and different forest benefits would help to address 
the potential for so-called ‘win-win’ strategies with respect to REDD+ and biodiversity conservation 
(e.g. see Phelps et al., 2012). Our model could help understand the extent to which potential ‘win-
wins’ may also be cost-effective in the design of schemes such as SISA, which aim to cover multiple 
environmental benefits of forests, and not just forest carbon alone. 
While our analysis is motivated by the fact of limited forest conservation budgets in Acre, we have 
little information on the precise nature of these budgets. Money is received from a variety of public 
sources and there may be potential for future funding from more diverse sources, perhaps 
depending on the future trajectory of federal REDD+ policy. So, while there is a possibility for a 
domestic federal REDD+ programme leading to inter-state financial transfers in the future, it remains 
to be seen whether there will be much scope for finance from international sources like California’s 
cap and trade system and multinational firms, especially given the recent withdrawal of the US from 
the Paris Agreement. Thus, the extent of future finance for Acre's REDD+ strategy remains unknown. 
Either way, our modelling exercise remains relevant, more so if we are able to improve upon our net 
profit estimates and scale up our per hectare estimates of policy costs in order to quantify aggregate 
costs both within municipalities and across Acre as a whole. Finally, we could build into our analysis 
the possibility of trading per reforms to Brazil's Forest Code. This would allow us to model the 
potential impacts of trading vis-à-vis REDD+ policy goals. 
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FIGURES & TABLES 
Figure 1: Daily net profits in US$ per ha for Bujari and Feijó, 2006-2010 
 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: ‘01’ denotes January; ‘04’ April; ‘07’ July; ‘10’ October 
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Figure 2: Relative cost of payment per ha to cover opportunity cost of each land use by 
municipality 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 3: Map of the minimum payment required to maintain forest in each municipality. 
 
Source: Authors  
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Figure 4: Relative cost per tonne carbon  
 
Source: Authors 
Note: Cost per tonne carbon is relative to value for the lowest cost municipality Santa Rosa do 
Purus (indexed at 1)  
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Table 1: Summary of patterns of per hectare daily net profits for pasture (cattle), corn, and coffee 
for Acre’s municipalities, 2006-2010  
Municipality Daily net profits are: Is there a strictly 
dominant 
profitable land 
use? 
Positive all the 
time 
Positive some of the 
time, negative 
otherwise  
Negative all the 
time 
Acrelandia  Coffee Pasture, corn No 
Assis Brasil  Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Brasiléia  Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Bujari  Coffee Corn Pasture Yes – coffee 
Capixaba Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn 
Cruzeiro do Sul   Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn 
Epitaciolândia  Corn  Pasture, coffee No 
Feijó   Coffee, corn Pasture No 
Jordão  Corn Coffee Pasture Yes – corn 
Mâncio Lima  Coffee  Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Manoel Urbano   Pasture, coffee, 
corn 
No 
Marechal 
Thaumaturgo 
Coffee Corn Pasture Yes – coffee  
Plácido de Castro Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Porto Walter  Corn Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Rio Branco  Corn Pasture, coffee No 
Rodrigues Alves  Coffee Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Santa Rosa do 
Purus 
 Coffee Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Sena Madureira Corn Coffee Pasture Yes – corn  
Senador 
Guiomard 
 Corn Pasture, coffee No 
Tarauacá  Corn, coffee Pasture No 
Xapuri Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Porto Acre Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Source: Authors 
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Table 2: Clearance costs by municipality for forest-corn, forest-coffee & forest-pasture (US$/ha) 
Municipality  
Forest-
corn 
Forest-
coffee 
Forest-
Pasture 
Acrelandia 1097 3714 1115 
Assis Brasil 911 3528 928 
Brasiléia 938 3555 955 
Bujari 1135 3752 1152 
Capixaba 929 3546 946 
Cruzeiro do Sul 441 3058 459 
Epitaciolândia 929 3546 946 
Feijó 347 2964 365 
Jordão 314 2931 331 
Mâncio Lima 491 3108 508 
Manoel Urbano 929 3546 946 
Marechal Thaumaturgo 401 3018 418 
Plácido de Castro 1097 3714 1115 
Porto Walter 461 3078 479 
Rio Branco 929 3546 946 
Rodrigues Alves 399 3016 416 
Santa Rosa do Purus 948 3565 965 
Sena Madureira 929 3546 946 
Senador Guiomard 1023 3640 1040 
Tarauacá 348 2965 365 
Xapuri 948 3565 965 
Porto Acre 1060 3677 1077 
 Source: Authors’ own calculations from data described in text  
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Table 3: Calibrated parameters for the three land uses by municipality 
Municipality  Corn Coffee Beef 
 μ σ μ σ μ σ 
Acrelandia -0.0003 0.0276 0.0005 0.379 -0.0003 0.0118 
Assis Brasil 0.0011 0.0205 -0.0017 0.0431 0.0001 0.0115 
Brasiléia 0.0015 0.0248 -0.0003 0.0109 0.0024 0.414 
Bujari 0.0006 0.5255 0.0007 0.0218 -0.0004 0.0097 
Capixaba 0.0014 0.0233 -0.0014 0.0402 0 0.0043 
Cruzeiro do Sul -0.0003 0.402 -0.0016 0.0426 0 0.0031 
Epitaciolândia -0.0003 0.277 -0.0013 0.0381 -0.0008 0.0197 
Feijó -0.0016 0.4148 0.0017 0.637 -0.0002 0.0073 
Jordão 0.0015 0.0237 0 0 -0.0017 0.152 
Mâncio Lima -0.0018 0.1958 0.0007 0.0225 -0.0001 0.0099 
Manoel Urbano 0.0002 0.0204 -0.0023 0.0435 -0.0001 0.0107 
Marechal 
Thaumaturgo -0.0017 0.2401 0.0008 0.023 0.0001 0.0064 
Plácido de Castro 0.0025 0.0551 -0.0014 0.0404 -0.0001 0.0054 
Porto Walter 0.0006 0.4496 -0.0018 0.0444 0.0001 0.0095 
Rio Branco -0.0013 0.1318 0.0019 0.0462 0.0002 0.0144 
Rodrigues Alves 0 0.0012 0 0 0 0.0042 
Santa Rosa do Purus 0 0.0117 0 0 0 0.0089 
Sena Madureira 0.0014 0.0274 -0.0002 0.2923 -0.0001 0.0088 
Senador Guiomard -0.0017 0.5053 -0.0001 0.007 -0.0001 0.0087 
Tarauacá 0.001 0.4021 -0.0001 0 0 0.0145 
Xapuri 0.0011 0.0201 -0.0017 0.0438 -0.0001 0.0113 
Porto Acre 0.001 0.0512 -0.0002 0.0077 -0.0001 0.030 
Source: Authors 
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Table 4: Ranked relative land-use returns under uncertainty (‘Cost’ per ha; lowest first) and mean 
carbon stock by municipality (ranking in parentheses, highest first) 
 
Rank Municipality  Cost (per ha) 
Mean carbon 
density 
 
 
Corn Coffee Pasture (Mg C / ha) 
1 Brasiléia 9.17 8.45 8.46 158.49 (13) 
2 Acrelandia 9.09 8.44 9.19 102.13 (18) 
3 Jordão 9.40 0.00 9.27 188.99 (2) 
4 Cruzeiro do Sul 8.81 7.10 9.43 161.05 (12) 
5 Plácido de Castro 9.34 8.55 9.53 72.13 (21) 
6 Porto Acre 9.41 7.42 9.57 138.40 (14) 
7 Rodrigues Alves 9.39 0.00 9.61 168.12 (10) 
8 Capixaba 9.53 8.24 9.61 98.57 (19) 
9 Marechal 
Thaumaturgo 9.19 7.18 9.64 170.32 (9) 
10 Porto Walter 8.64 7.25 9.72 96.69 (10) 
11 Rio Branco 9.44 8.28 9.74 164.70 (11) 
12 Epitaciolândia 8.83 8.43 9.75 117.95 (16) 
13 Sena Madureira 9.14 7.69 9.76 183.53 (3) 
 
14 Senador Guiomard 8.55 7.69 9.76 
 
171.28 (8) 
15 Mâncio Lima 9.26 7.47 9.83 171.58 (7) 
16 Santa Rosa do 
Purus 9.83 0.00 9.76 128.10 (15) 
17 Assis Brasil 9.72 8.09 9.84 189.24 (1) 
18 Tarauacá 8.66 7.69 9.87 59.99 (22) 
19 Manoel Urbano 9.73 8.08 9.88 178.56 (4) 
20 Feijó 8.71 8.06 9.88 177.01 (5) 
21 Xapuri 9.75 8.07 9.91 175.78 (6) 
22 Bujari 7.69 8.90 9.94 111.29 (17) 
Source: Authors 
Note: Although we use 90% (p = 0.9), there are a number of cases in which the variability of the 
alternative land use (corn, coffee, pasture) was so small that it was numerically challenging to 
identify the fixed REDD+ payment  (see footnote 6) in order to ensure that forest was preferred by 
the landowner exactly 90 times out of 100.    
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APPENDIX 
1. Production data 
Table A1: Municipality-scale area and production for pasture/cattle, corn, and coffee, 2006 
2. Data used to estimate daily profits 
Prices (P) 
Prices for corn, coffee and cattle are obtained from CEPEA.5 These data are for daily prices recorded 
on exchanges in São Paulo. Given the remoteness of Acre state to this market the prices that farmers 
receive for their product is likely to differ from those offered in São Paulo. Factors such as 
transportation costs and the extent of local demand are likely to cause a variation in prices. We 
convert the daily price series into an estimation of Acre-level prices. The difference between the 
prices in Rio Branco (obtained from quantity and value data provided by IBGE, 2006) and São Paulo 
on January 1, 2006 is calculated. This gives a relative difference in prices on that date, which are 
then applied to the time series as a whole. Three different price series resulted: a São Paulo price for 
which transportation to São Paulo must be added; a Rio Branco price that is a relative amendment of 
the São Paulo price; and, a Rio Branco price that is an absolute level amendment of the São Paulo 
price. For the latter two, transportation costs to Rio Branco are added. Based on the nature of the 
commodities and markets the price series for corn and cattle are taken from Rio Branco with the 
relative amendment, given the likelihood that much of this production is consumed within the State. 
For coffee, we use the São Paulo price given that much of this product is transported out of the State 
for export. 
Yields (Y) 
Municipality level annual yields for coffee and corn are drawn directly from the Brazilian Agricultural 
Census.6 Cattle yield is estimated using data on head of cattle and area of pasture from the Census.7 
An average weight of 450kg per head of cattle and an annual offtake of 8.5% are assumed based on 
Bowman et al. (2012).   
Labour, fertiliser and fuel costs (L, Fe, Fu) 
We draw upon municipality-level cost data for labour, fertiliser and fuel for corn, cattle and coffee 
from the 2006 Brazilian Agricultural Census.8 This gives total municipality-level production 
expenditure for a variety of different inputs for the year 2006. Costs per hectare are calculated using 
municipality acreage, also drawn from the Brazilian Agricultural Census.9  
For corn and coffee some missing cost data are estimated by the authors. We drew inference from 
the data that are available in order to estimate substitute observations for the areas where data are 
missing. Thus, we estimate substitutes for missing observations based on the rationale that costs per 
hectare are a function of yield and production inputs. Our implicit assumption is that there is a fixed 
mix of production inputs suitable for growing these crops across the Legal Amazon, and 
                                                          
5
 Data were obtained from http://cepea.esalq.usp.br/english/  
6
 Yields are calculated using quantity and acreage from Table 949 of the 2006 census. The entry ‘Milho em 
grão’ is used for corn. 
7
 Head of cattle from Table 73 of the 2006 census and area of pasture from Table 1031. 
8
 Table 5445 of the 2006 census. Data for ‘Cultibatio de cereais’ and coffee was used.. 
9
 Table 949 of the 2006 census for Corn and Coffee, and Table 1031 for Cattle. 
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acknowledge that this assumption neglects intra-regional variation in farming techniques and unit 
costs of inputs.    
Knowing the level of one input we can estimate the costs of other key inputs. For corn, we find a 
significant relationship between fertiliser and salary costs and hence, estimate missing fertiliser costs 
using coefficients from a regression of fertiliser costs on salary costs for all municipalities in the Legal 
Amazon. For coffee, data are estimated for total, fertiliser, salary and fuel costs. We find a significant 
relationship between fuel costs and yield and yield-squared and use this relationship to estimate fuel 
costs – again based on a regression that uses data across all municipalities in the Legal Amazon. Fuel 
costs are then found to be a significant predictor of each of total, fertiliser and salary costs, which 
allows us to estimate the remaining costs, yet again based on a regression using data across all 
municipalities in the Legal Amazon. Details of variables used and the regression results can be seen 
in Tables A1 and A2.  
Table A2: Variables used in regressions 
Table A3: Regression results 
We use these cost data to create a March 31, 2006 benchmark for labour, fuel and fertiliser before 
scaling each one of these factors with a relevant price index in order to obtain daily prices. Gasoline 
and fertiliser prices are scaled using, respectively, monthly gasoline prices from Reuters for the 
Central-West region of Brazil, and a weekly time series for the price of Monoammonium Phosphate 
in Brazil from the CRU group, i.e. used as a proxy for all fertilisers. Labour costs are converted into 
daily costs across the time series using the industrial labour wages index for North and Central-West 
Brazil (IBGE, 2006). 
Fixed costs (Fix) 
Agricultural production requires a variety of other costs beyond labour, fuel and fertiliser costs. The 
Brazilian Agricultural Census reports costs in a number of other categories including lease costs of 
the land, seeds, packaging, pesticides, taxes and machine rental. As the prices of these items are 
unlikely to vary on a daily basis we aggregate them together into a fixed costs item at the level 
reported in the 2006 Census. This level is assumed fixed for the entire five-year time period. 
Transportation Costs (T) 
Transportation costs are calculated using cost per unit per km obtained from SIFRECA’s Anuario 2010 
(SIFRECA, 2010). Mid-term costs per km for 2010 were used for each of the three commodities and 
converted into US$ using an exchange rate of 1:2.135 (obtained from Oanda10). For each 
municipality, the shortest distance by road to Rio Branco and Sao Paulo is estimated from Google 
maps. For those municipalities with no road access, fixed distances of 4500km to Sao Paulo and 
1000km to Rio Branco are used. Cost per unit per km is converted into cost per hectare using our 
yield data. We note that T is a crude measure of transportation costs in that it may not reflect the 
proximity of farms to roads. Yet, it is commonly observed that proximity to roads is associated with 
deforestation (see Ferretti-Gallon and Busch, 2014). In many parts of the Brazilian Amazon, farms 
are often found near roads, e.g. those established by the Federal government’s resettlement 
programs (see Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 2011).    
                                                          
10
 See: http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/  
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Daily, total net profits are calculated by multiplying daily prices by yield per hectare to generate total 
revenue per hectare. These production costs are then subtracted from net revenue to give net 
profits per hectare per day. 
Other data 
Clearance and conversion costs 
Crucial to the decision to convert forest to agriculture is the cost of clearing forest and converting 
the remaining land so that it is suitable for agriculture. Clearance and conversion costs are 
composed of three components that differ depending on the type of conversion. For conversion 
from standing forest there is a cost of clearing the trees and potential revenue from selling some of 
the cleared timber. For establishment of each of the different commodities there are various 
infrastructural costs.  
The costs of clearing forest are drawn from estimates of forest management in Acre by d’Oliveira et 
al. (2005), which are given as US$48.4 per m3 of harvested timber. Revenues from selling cleared 
timber are calculated given an estimated volume of commercial timber per ha for Acre of 20 m3/ha 
(ibid). Timber prices are drawn from roundwood timber prices calculated from quantity produced 
and value reported by IBGE. These are converted to US$ using the January 2006 exchange rate from 
Oanda. 
Infrastructure costs are sourced from de Almedia and Uhl (1995). Estimates for slash and burn 
annual crops are used for corn infrastructure, intensive agriculture/perennial crops are used for 
coffee and unimproved pastures are used for cattle. The 1995 estimates are converted to 2006 
estimates by first converting the figures into Brazilian Real using the 1995 exchange rate from 
Oanda, applying the World Bank GDP deflator, and then converting back to US$ using the 2006 
exchange rate.  
Carbon density 
Carbon density data are extracted from the underlying 1km x 1km carbon map in Saatchi et al. 
(2011). Mean carbon density per hectare (MgC per ha) is estimated for each municipality. These are 
mapped onto Figure A1, with the municipalities ranked in Figure A2 as box plots that show the 
distribution of carbon density within each municipality. From Figure A1, it can be seen that the 
lowest mean carbon densities are to be found in municipalities near the State capital, Rio Branco. 
These municipalities also display greater variation around the mean values in the form of larger 
boxes, which suggests the presence of a greater diversity of forest in different stages of transition, 
from pristine, primary forest to heavily degraded forest, in contrast to some of the more remote 
municipalities. 
Figure A1: Map of mean carbon density (MgC/ha) for each municipality in Acre State 
Figure A2: Ranking of mean carbon density (in MgC/ha, lowest to highest) by municipality in Acre 
State 
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APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES 
Table A1: Municipality-scale area and production for pasture/cattle, corn, and coffee, 2006 
Municipality  Coffee Corn Pasture 
  Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(head cattle) 
Acrelândia 382 548 1040 5140 23939 178905 
Assis Brasil  37 35 142 525 4692 26398 
Brasiléia   132 144 1538 5700 27308 171864 
Bujari   2 2 890 3080 37519 208766 
Capixabaa   13 11 834 3377 19195 118943 
Cruzeiro do Sul  32 40 1221 2413 10416 42394 
Epitaciolândia  42 21 1190 4410 15088 71324 
Feijó  9 16 921 3415 14912 60600 
Jordão  0 0 284 983 1913 4509 
Mâncio Lima  2 2 180 401 1945 16035 
Manoel Urbano  40 14 162 600 3004 22839 
Marechal Thaumaturgo 6 10 422 1113 847 4957 
Plácido de Castro 62 56 550 2702 28650 163166 
Porto Walter  0 0 194 479 990 4431 
Rio Branco  28 33 524 1944 52926 454728 
Rodrigues Alves  28 35 236 584 3987 11553 
Santa Rosa do Purus  0 0 12 36 730 2189 
Senador Guiomard  65 64 736 3960 38584 257518 
Sena Madureira  150 48 1303 4830 39587 186642 
Tarauacá   0 0 1560 5781 22177 97552 
Xapuri  17 16 579 2145 31546 204163 
Porto Acre  38 36 808 2994 37855 143439 
Source: IBGE (2006) 
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Table A2: Variables used in regressions 
Variable Description Source 
Corn Fertiliser Fertiliser costs per 
hectare for corn 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE  
Corn Salary Salary costs per hectare 
for corn production per 
annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Fuel Fuel costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level  
IBGE 
Coffee Salary Salary costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Fertiliser Fertiliser costs per 
hectare for coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Total Total costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Yield Yield in tonnes per 
hectare of coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Yield squared Yield in tonnes per 
hectare of coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
squared 
IBGE 
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Table A3: Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Corn 
Fertiliser 
Coffee 
Fuel 
Coffee Fertiliser Coffee 
Salary 
Coffee 
Total 
      
Corn Salary 1.7096*** 
(0.13203) 
    
      
Coffee Yield  0.0005346*** 
(0.000184) 
   
 
Coffee Yield-
squared 
 -1.54e-08*** 
(5.53e-09) 
   
      
      
Coffee Fuel   0.1473*** 
(0.01884) 
1.1895*** 
(0.04618) 
10.489*** 
(0.5866) 
Constant -0.00699 
(0.2576) 
0.2849 
(0.2534) 
-0.01154 
(0.02746) 
-0.0363 
(0.05306) 
-2.3230 
(1.2678) 
      
Observations 302 86 76 64 76 
Source: Authors 
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Figure A1: Map of mean carbon density (MgC/ha) for each municipality in Acre State 
 
Source: Authors; data from Saatchi et al. (2011) 
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Figure A2: Ranking of mean carbon density (in MgC/ha, lowest to highest) by municipality in Acre 
State 
 
Source: Authors; data from Saatchi et al. (2011) 
Note: the centre of each box is the mean value; the extent of each box denotes one standard 
deviation around the mean. 
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